The division of bequests among family members differs sharply between Japan and the United States. Whereas in the United States, bequests tend to be divided equally among decedents' children, they tend to be divided unequally in Japan. This paper first tries to answer why this is this case. We start by arguing that certain legal and institutional aspects that lead to equal bequests in the United States are not present in Japan. We then investigate patterns of bequest division in Japan to understand parental bequest motives. In particular, we compare the division of bequests in primary and secondary inheritances to examine parental motives and the role of traditional family values in Japan. While in the case of both "primary" and "secondary" inheritances (referring to inheritances where the first parent has died and inheritances in which the second parent has died, respectively) the patterns of bequest division in Japan look generally consistent with a variety of parental bequest motives proposed in the literature, the role of these motives, especially of the dynastic and strategic motives, is more prominent in primary inheritances, in which the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her intentions. However, Japanese parents, contrary to predictions of the altruism model, appear not to bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children. JEL classification codes: D13, D31, D64
Introduction
Bequests feature prominently in theoretical and empirical discussions of household savings, capital accumulation, fiscal and tax policies, and the distribution of income and assets. Gaining a better understanding of bequest motives therefore is of considerable relevance for a wide range of issues in economics and economic policy. For instance, altruism-based bequests provide the foundation for models with infinite-lived agents (see, e.g., Barro [1974] ), which are widely used in economic analyses.
Most hypotheses regarding bequest motives imply that one would expect decedents to divide their estate unequally among children. If bequests reflect parental altruism (as in Barro [1974] and Becker [1974] ) or intra-family exchange (as in Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985] , Cox [1987] and Cox and Rank [1992] ), the division of bequests should vary with the characteristics of households as well as those of decedents and their heirs. However, in a number of Western countries, most notably the United States, there is substantial evidence that parental bequests to children are nonetheless typically divided equally (e.g., Menchik [1980, 1988] , Wilhelm [1996] , McGarry [1999] , Behrman and Rosenzweig [2004] , Light and McGarry [2004] , Norton and Van Houtven [2006] for the United States; Arrondel, Masson, and Pestieau [1997] for France; and Ohlsson [2007] for Sweden). This finding has been regarded as a challenge to existing theories on intergenerational transfers and came to be known as the "equal division puzzle." One possible explanation is that equal division reflects accidental bequests or parental indifference, but such explanations do not take into account that parents treat their children unequally when making inter vivos transfers (gifts) to their children (e.g., Dunn and Phillips [1997] , McGarry [1999] and Hochguertel and Ohlsson [2009] ).
Given this puzzle, the equal division of bequests has attracted considerable research attention and thanks to such research, and especially the study by Bernheim and Severinov (2003) , a consensus regarding the mechanisms underlying the equal division of bequests in the United States appears to have emerged, highlighting the following:  While parents often prefer to treat their children unequally for a variety of reasons, they do not want this to be known to their children or to third parties.

Intergenerational asset transfers can be divided into two types: transfers observable only to those involved in the transfer, such as life insurance claims, trust assets, and gifts; and transfers that are also observable to others than those involved, such as bequests, especially through probate.
When parents choose to transfer their assets unequally among their children, they have incentives to do so stealthily and to treat the observable part equally.
While earlier studies appear to have helped to elucidate the mechanisms giving rise to the puzzle, they also made clear the inconvenient fact that studies on probate records in the United States ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 3 may not be helpful for understanding the motives underlying intergenerational asset transfers.
(Equally divided estates in probate records are unlikely to contain rich information on the bequest motives.)
Against this background, this study focuses on the intra-family division of estates in Japan, which has different institutions (and incentive structures) and cultural norms from the United States regarding bequests, in order to examine (indirectly) the validity of existing explanations of the "equal division puzzle" and to elucidate the bequest motives to the greatest extent possible. In contrast with Western countries, there are few studies on the division of estates in Japan, with the exception of a few survey-based descriptive analyses by Horioka (1984 Horioka ( , 2002 Horioka ( , and 2014 . Using data from a questionnaire survey designed and implemented by our research group on inheritances, we first show the fact that actual bequests are divided quite unequally among children in Japan. 1 We then investigate patterns of bequest division in Japan to understand parental bequest motives.
We start by reviewing legal and other institutions related to bequests in the two countries and, based on this, argue that some of the circumstances resulting in equal division in the United
States are not present in Japan. We further argue that certain cultural and social norms and practices in Japan also mean that one would expect unequal division in Japan. Since the way inheritances are divided among children are bound to reflect the motives for leaving bequests, investigating bequest patterns should provide useful information for understanding parental bequest motives. Moreover, by comparing bequest patterns in primary inheritances -that is, inheritances where the first parent has died but a surviving spouse is present -and secondary inheritances -that is, inheritances where the second parent has also died and hence no parent is present -we attempt to elucidate parental motives and the role of traditional family values in Japan. While both in the case of primary and secondary inheritances bequest patterns in our survey-based micro data look generally consistent with a variety of bequest motives proposed in the literature, the role of those motives, especially that of dynastic (family line) and strategic motives, is more conspicuous in primary inheritances, in which the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her view. However, Japanese parents, contrary to predictions of the altruism model, do not appear to bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children, although children appear to allocate bequests altruistically to ensure that a (disadvantaged) surviving parent is financially supported.
1 Although some opinion survey-based studies, such as Horioka (2014) , report that respondents preferred equal bequest division, surveys generally indicate that actual bequests were typically divided unequally. For instance, according to the Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households (Kakei ni okeru Kinyu Shisan Sentaku ni kan suru Chosa) by the Postal Services Research Institute, two-thirds of respondents answered that bequests from parents were actually distributed disproportionately to a particular heir (such as the person who took care of the deceased parent(s) or is taking over the family business, or the eldest child). ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households"
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The study makes the following (original) contributions in the literature. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the patterns of actual bequest division, instead of intended division, by households in Japan, where estates are typically divided unequally among children. It is also the first study to use microdata on the bequest share of individual heirs to examine parental bequest motives, while most previous studies use bivariate data to identify whether estates are divided equally or not. Furthermore, it compares the patterns of bequest division of primary and secondary inheritances to identify parental bequest motives separately from other motives reflecting the shared values of other family members, whereas most previous studies in Western countries focus only on secondary inheritances. Finally, the analysis in this study carefully takes account of legal, institutional, and cultural differences between Japan and the United States. Therefore, the empirical findings reported in this study based on microdata from a unique household survey that has a wealth of information on bequest division provide important insights on parental bequest motives that are of relevance for economic researchers and policy makers not only in Japan but also elsewhere.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section describes the legal, cultural, and social institutions surrounding inheritances in Japan to provide some background to the contrasting patterns of bequest division between the United States and Japan. Section 3 then introduces our data source, the "Family and Lifestyle Survey," and discusses the data used for the analysis. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy to identify bequest motives, while Section 5 reports our estimation results and discusses their implications. Finally, Section 6 summarizes out findings and concludes.
Institutional differences between Japan and the United States
We start our discussion by examining key legal and cultural institutions and norms in the United States and Japan. Understanding these institutions helps to understand the reasons for the contrasting patterns of bequest division between the two countries.
Wills and will substitutes
Both in Japan and the United States, inheritance laws, as a general rule, stipulate that children shall receive equal shares of a parent's bequest. If parents want to divide their bequest unequally among their children, the most straightforward way to do so is to prepare a will. This, however, means that their children (as well as third parties) will know about the unequal treatment. In practice, roughly 30 to 50 percent of decedents in the United States die testate, but their wills usually do not allocate bequests disproportionately among children and are simply prepared to ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 5 reduce the burden of cumbersome probate. 2 Instead of giving instructions for an unequal division of the bequest among children, wills are typically drawn up to prepare for two contingent states, namely, whether the decedent's spouse is still alive at the time of bequest or not.
If parents want to divide their bequest unequally among their children without their children being aware of this, a common practice in the United States is to transfer assets through will substitutes and/or inter vivos gifts. Will substitutes are means that allow a parent to transfer assets at his/her death to heirs outside of the probate process, in which documents become part of the public record and can be accessed not only by heirs, but also by the general public. Examples of will substitutes include irrevocable living trusts and life insurance, where a deceased person designates a beneficiary to whom payments are made after his/her death. Since parents in the United States typically want to keep any unequal treatment of children secret, will substitutes as well as inter vivos gifts are widely used.
In contrast, in Japan, people usually neither leave a will 3 nor use will substitutes or gifts as means of unequal intergenerational asset transfers to heirs (children). As explained in detail later, the tradition in Japan is to regard the assets left by a decedent not as his/her personal property but as family property. Therefore, although civil law in Japan has stipulations regarding the statutory division of bequests, the most common procedure is to divide inherited assets in a negotiation among surviving family members. In the negotiation process, the inherited assets can be distributed freely as long as the heirs can come to an agreement, regardless of whether a will was left or not. 4 While in the United States non-statutory distributions would be regarded as taxable gifts, in Japan such distributions are treated as part of the inheritance and heirs can allocate the inherited assets among themselves costlessly as they like (evenly or unevenly). Moreover, since a cumbersome probate process does not exist in Japan, there is no need to avoid it through the use of a will or will substitutes.
Inheritance, estate, and gift tax laws
One of the most important determinants of differences between the United States and Japan is differences in the tax system. That being said, in both countries, it is (in principle) not possible to avoid asset transfer taxes through manipulation of the way bequests are divided among children. 5 2 The probate process consists of verifying the validity of the deceased's will, identifying and listing the deceased's property, having the property appraised, paying the deceased's remaining debts and taxes and distributing the property to heirs. Since a probate can be time-consuming and costly, i.e., it takes months to a year to complete the process and attorney and court fees can add up to 5 to 7 percent of the total value of the estate, individuals have a strong incentive to avoid a probate. 3 According to our survey data, less than 10 percent of decedents in Japan leave a will. 4 In Japan, wills have legal binding force only when heirs cannot form a consensus regarding the division of a bequest through negotiation. 5 Taxation of inherited assets around the world can generally be classified into the following two categories: ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 6 Therefore, the contrasting patterns in bequest division do not result from differences in the degree of tax (dis)advantages of the unequal treatment of children. Instead, what appears to make a difference is the cost of making gifts (relative to bequests).
In Japan, the tax burden is much higher for inter vivos gifts than for bequests. Recipients of gifts are subject to gift tax if they receive gifts exceeding ¥1.1 million (ca. $10,000) in any given year. On the other hand, until 2014, Japanese inheritance tax law set a very high exemption level of ¥50 million plus ¥10 million × the numbers of statutory heirs, 6 meaning that only about 4 percent of inheritances were subject to inheritance tax. Moreover, in Japan, the progressivity of gift taxes is far greater than that of inheritance taxes. It is likely due to these aspects of the tax system that in Japan bequests make up a larger share of intergenerational asset transfers than in the United States.
On the other hand, in the United States, it is possible to significantly reduce the total amount of transfer taxes (i.e., inheritance/estate taxes plus gift taxes) by making gifts, since federal law provides various tax breaks for gifts. Specifically, until the 1976 tax reform, gift and estate taxes were treated separately, and gifts were taxed more modestly than bequests. It was therefore possible to reduce transfer tax payments by transferring wealth in the form of gifts. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 equalized the tax rates on gifts and estates and established a new transfer credit system that applies to gift and estate taxes in order to prevent individuals, especially the wealthy, from avoiding (or reducing) estate taxes by making gifts. 7 However, even though gift and estate taxes were integrated, U.S. tax law still allows each individual to make tax-free transfers up to $14,000 per recipient per year. 8 This means that a married couple can make inter vivos gifts of up to $28,000 (per recipient per year) without incurring any taxes, so that the amount exempted from tax is more than twice as large as in Japan. These considerations suggest that the (1) inheritance taxation (examples are countries such as France and Germany), and (2) estate taxation (such as in the United States and the United Kingdom). The former imposes a tax on heirs receiving bequests from a decedent. The tax amount is calculated separately for each heir based on the individual's bequest, and the individual is responsible for paying his/her own inheritance taxes. On the other hand, the latter imposes a tax on the decedent who left the assets. In practice, the executor (of the decedent's will) instead of the decedent him/herself carries out the tax payment procedures. The tax calculation is based on the total value of the inherited assets. Therefore, the total tax amount does not vary with the distribution of the bequests in the case of estate taxation, while it depends on the bequest division in the case of inheritance taxation. Although Japan's inheritance tax system is a hybrid of these two systems, it can be broadly regarded as a form of estate taxation in the sense that the total tax amount is determined by the total value of the inherited assets. 6 The threshold for inheritance tax exemption was reduced in January 1, 2015 to ¥30 million (basic exemption) plus ¥6 million × the numbers of statutory heirs. It is said that the percentage of inheritances due to inheritance tax will rise to about 6 percent. 7 A number of previous studies repeatedly demonstrate that wealthy individuals are likely to make intergenerational transfers during their lifetime in order to reduce or avoid eventual estate taxes (e.g., McGarry [2000] , Poterba [2001] , Joulfaian and McGarry [2004] and Joulfaian [2004 Joulfaian [ , 2005 ). 8 The gift threshold was $10,000 in 2002 and since then has been raised by $1,000 every three years to adjust for inflation.
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 7 relatively generous tax treatment of inter vivos gifts is a key reason why they are widely used in the United States. 9 Intergenerational transfers through will substitutes also appear to enjoy several tax advantages in the United States. For example, one of the most tax-efficient vehicles for transferring assets to descendants is a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT). A GRAT is an irrevocable trust designed to transfer the future appreciation of the trust assets to family members (such as the grantor's children). A grantor transfers a portion of his/her property into a GRAT in return for a stream of annuity payments for a fixed number of years. During the term of the GRAT, the grantor receives back the full value of his/her initial contribution plus statutory interest in the form of annuity payments. If the value of the annuity payments is equal to the funds transferred into the trust, plus applicable statutory interest, no gift tax will be due when the GRAT is created.
Any funds remaining in the trust upon expiration of the annuity term passes to beneficiaries at no additional gift tax cost. This implies that any capital appreciation of the trust in excess of the applicable statutory rate is transferred to the beneficiaries with no additional gift tax, probably promoting wide use of GRATs as a will substitutes in the United States.
Family system
Another aspect that is bound to play a role in the contrasting bequest patterns is the family system in Japan. The Japanese traditional family system, called 'ie,' dating back to the Edo period (1603-1868) became legally enshrined during the Meiji period through the formulation of civil law. The traditional family system is characterized by the following two aspects: (i) strong patriarchal control, and (ii) inequality among family members. Essentially, this implies that the paternal head of the household wields authority over all other family members and that males are treated more favorably than females. For example, Meiji civil law distinguished between inheritances of the family estate following the death of the household head (katoku souzoku) and inheritances following the death of other family members involving assets other than the family estate (isan souzoku). In the former case, the eldest son was designated as the only statutory heir of the family estate, 10 while in the latter case, assets were divided equally among children. 11 Following the major revision of civil law in 1947, from a legal perspective all family 9 In fact, the share of people that have received inter vivos gifts from their parents appears to differ substantially between the United States and Japan. According to the Health and Retirement Study, approximately 10 to 20 percent of children in the United States had received inter vivos transfers from their parents in the past two years (see McGarry [2016] ), while the broadly corresponding figure for Japanese individuals reported in the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers is less than 2 percent. 10 Under the traditional family system, the eldest son was obliged to support his parents in exchange for inheriting the family estate. 11 Ordinary inheritances did not occur very often, since ordinary family members rarely held their own assets. 
A hypothetical explanation for the contrasting patterns
Given the institutional differences between Japan and the United States outlined above, we can form a hypothetical explanation of the contrasting patterns of intra-family bequest division between the United States and Japan.
Following Bernheim and Severinov (2003) , we assume that, for certain reasons, parents (both in the United States and Japan) often prefer to divide their assets unequally among their children, but do not want their children (as well as third parties) to know this. The way parents aim to achieve this is not through a will, since this would not keep any unequal treatment secret. This is where parents in the United States and Japan act differently. In the United States, gifts and will substitutes provide tax advantages, so that these are likely to be chosen to transfer assets to a particular child or particular children. In contrast, in Japan, high taxes on gifts act as a disincentive for inter vivos transfers, so that a larger share of the deceased's assets are transferred through (unequal) bequests. Moreover, as unequal bequests are still accepted as the traditional norm by family members, i.e., both inheriting children as well as parents, inheritances in Japan are often allocated unevenly among children (through family negotiations among heirs), reflecting the values shared by the family, which in turn are informed by traditional family values in Japan (including how bequests should be divided among heirs).
Based on this hypothetical explanation, in the following sections we examine the pattern of unequal bequest division in Japan to elucidate parental motives to leave assets to their children.
Data description

Data source
The microdata used in this paper are taken from the three waves of the "Family and Lifestyle ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 9 Survey," conducted in December 2011 (first wave) and 2012 (second wave) by our research group (see and Hori, Iwamoto, Niizeki, Hamaaki, and Murata [2013] , for details) and in February 2014 by the Economic and Social Research Institute (third wave). 12 The survey collects information on asset holdings and intergenerational transfers, including inheritances, for individuals in households. The survey asks whether respondents received inter vivos gifts and inheritances from their parents. Furthermore, the survey is particularly notable for the detailed questions it contains intended to throw light on the way how inherited assets are divided among heirs, such as the percentage of inherited assets that individual heirs received (percentage in terms of the total assets left by a deceased parent), whether the deceased parents left a will, and whether they were subject to inheritance taxation.
The subjects of the first survey were the pool of approximately 220,000 consumer testers across Japan who were preregistered by INTAGE Inc., the largest market research firm in Japan.
In creating the sample, we divided Japan into 10 areas and chose a total of 4,525 male and female registered testers aged between 25 and 75 to whom to send questionnaires. The respondents (testers) were chosen in such a way that the breakdown by individual area for both sexes resembled that obtained from the Population Census of Japan. In the first wave, we received valid responses from 3,699 participants for a response rate of 81.7%. The subsequent surveys targeted the respondents to the previous survey. We obtained 3,144 valid responses from the 3,647 individuals to whom the questionnaire was sent in the second wave (valid response rate: 86.2%) and 2,357 values responses from the 3,112 individuals to whom it was sent in the third wave (valid response rate: 75.7%).
It should be noted that the average educational attainment of the INTAGE testers was higher and the percentage of single-person households was lower than that in the Population Census. In that sense, the sample, rather than being fully representative of Japan's population today, can be regarded as being biased towards middle or upper-income households. This point requires due consideration when analyzing the data, but in general the breakdown by sex, area, and age conforms to the distributions observed in the Population Census.
Descriptive statistics
This subsection provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of bequests and respondent characteristics (or characteristics of respondents' spouse). First, we describe the distribution of bequest amounts. Since our survey asks not only about respondents' inheritance events but also their spouse's, we have a maximum of four observations (for each of the four parents) for each household. Overall, there are 5,215 deaths of respondents' and respondents' spouse's parents in ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" our survey data, and in 1,927 cases the deceased parent left a bequest. Table 1 shows the distribution of bequest amounts. While roughly 56% of respondents received only a small bequest worth less than ¥5 million yen (including those that did not receive any bequest or refused it), about 6% received bequests exceeding ¥30 million yen. From this, it can be inferred that while some respondents received a very large bequest, the majority of respondents inherited only a small amount of assets. This inference is supported by the descriptive statistics of the exact amount of inherited assets shown in Table 2 . Because of a small number of outliers -including an extremely large bequest of 3 billion yen -the mean value is very large. However, the median value is only 3.5 million yen.
Second, we compare the share of inheritance events subject to an inheritance tax in our survey with the corresponding share for Japan overall. In our dataset, out of the 5,215 observations of a deceased parent, 227 involved a bequest that was subject to inheritance tax. The share thus is 4.4 percent (=227/5,215). On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance reports that the corresponding value for Japan's population as a whole is roughly 4 percent on average over the past two decades. 13 Since these two values are very similar, the responses in our survey as well as the sampling scheme appear to be generally reliable.
The characteristics of observations used for our regression analysis (in Section 5) are shown in Table 3 . The average age of individuals in the dataset -that is, respondents and their spouses -is 58.9 years. 63 percent of individuals are male. The average number of siblings -that is, respondents plus their brother(s) and sister(s) or respondents' spouse plus their brother(s) and sister(s) -is slightly above three, while almost 40 percent of respondents or their spouses are the eldest son in the family (including only children). 46 percent of individuals are university graduates, while 52 percent are senior high school, junior college, or technical college graduates.
The fact that the individuals in our sample appear to be better educated than the population overall probably reflects the fact that, already mentioned, the INTAGE testers are biased towards middle or upper-income households. Meanwhile, about a third of respondents said that the deceased parent had lived with them. Regarding financial assistance between parents and children, 11 percent of respondents indicated that they were providing (or provided) financial assistance to their parents, while 7 percent said that they were receiving (or had received) financial assistance from their parent(s). Finally, the average age of the surviving parent at the time of death of the other parent was about 70 years.
Empirical strategy 4.1 Outline "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives:
Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households"
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The empirical strategy we employ in this study is to investigate the division of bequests among children in Japan to understand parental bequest motives. While the fact that in Japan inherited assets are divided through family negotiations implies that the observed patterns reflect not only the motives of decedents but also those of heirs, it is very likely that heirs' choices reflect the values shared by their family, including traditional Japanese family values. Furthermore, to shed more light on parental motives, we compare the patterns of bequest division between when a parent dies before his/her spouse (i.e., a primary inheritance) and when the second parent subsequently also dies (i.e., a secondary inheritance). In the former case, the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her opinion and to play a leading role as an advocate of the decedent in dividing the bequest. Therefore, it is likely that the resulting patterns of bequest division in primary inheritances reflect parental bequest motives more clearly than those in secondary inheritances.
Unfortunately, similar studies comparing primary and secondary inheritances in the United States are unavailable, probably because observations on bequest division among children in primary inheritance are very limited. In the United States, when a decedent does not leave a valid will assets are divided among heirs in line with state laws on intestacy. In the case of primary inheritances, state laws typically designate a large share of a bequest to be reserved for the spouse (with the remainder to be divided equally among children). More specifically, in states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), assets are passed on in their entirety to the surviving spouse if all surviving descendants of the decedent are also descendants of the surviving spouse.
While the formula for the division of bequests among heirs differs across states that have not adopted UPC, a typical allocation would give the first $50,000 of a bequest plus half of everything above $50,000 to the spouse. Therefore, as long as bequests do not exceed a specific threshold (e.g., $50,000), there is no bequest division among children in primary inheritances in the United
States.
As preparation for our regression analysis, we start with a descriptive examination of whether bequest shares in Japan deviate from statutory shares. While it is common to divide inherited assets among heirs through negotiations, present civil law specifies the statutory shares that heirs should receive if no will has been left and they cannot reach agreement on how a bequest should be divided. In the case of a married couple with children, the law designates the decedent's spouse and children as the heirs-at-law. While the spouse is entitled to receive half of the bequest in a primary inheritance, the remaining half would be equally distributed to the children. In a secondary inheritance, the decedent's children are the heirs-at-law and bequests would be equally divided only among them. Therefore, if in a secondary inheritance inherited assets are divided equally among children, there should be no deviation from the statutory shares. In contrast, if inherited assets are divided unequally among children, we would observe deviations of the actual ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 12 from the statutory shares. that a non-negligible share of families divide their bequests in a manner that diverges from the statutory shares. More specifically, the ratio of families dividing bequests differently from the statutory shares ranges from about 60 to 80 percent, and the mean deviation from the statutory 14 This is well known as a major tax-saving strategy in Japan. This strategy tends to yield tax advantages if (i) the amount of inherited assets in the primary inheritance is very large, (ii) a surviving parent holds a large amount of assets, or (iii) the number of children (i.e., heirs of the secondary inheritance) is small. When a surviving parent inherits a large amount of assets from his/her spouse in the primary inheritance and does not spend much, his/her children would inherit a large bequest in the secondary inheritance when the surviving parent dies. Since in a secondary inheritance neither the spousal allowance (i.e., ¥160 million yen or the amount of statutory bequests for the surviving spouse, whichever is greater) nor the basic allowance for the surviving spouse (i.e., ¥10 million yen until 2014 and ¥6 million yen from 2015 onward) can be used, large bequests will eventually be heavily taxed. In order to avoid this, people usually try to decrease the surviving parent's share and increase the children's share in the primary inheritance. "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives:
Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 13 share is roughly 20 to 30 percentage points regardless of the number of siblings. We conjecture from the above figures that while statutory shares appear to be treated as an important reference by families in Japan, a sizable portion of families divide their bequests in a manner different from the statutory division (i.e., different from the equal division among children). In order to examine how and why bequests are not divided equally in Japan, we regress the size of deviations from the statutory share on a variety of explanatory variables that proxy for the following five motives: (i) the dynastic (or family line) motive, (ii) the desire to treat children impartially, (iii) altruism toward family members, (iv) the parental strategic (or exchange) motive, and (v) other motives.
Regression specification
We estimate the following equation to examine the determinants of the division of bequests among heirs:
where is the percentage deviation of respondent 's actual share in a bequest from his/her statutory share and is defined as follows:
where ℎ and ℎ represent respondent i's actual and statutory shares, respectively. is a vector of respondent (or his/her spouse) i's and his/her parents' characteristics. is an error term that is assumed to be independently and normally distributed with mean zero and covariance σ 2 . We estimate equation (1) separately for primary and secondary inheritances, since, as explained above, patterns of bequest division are likely to differ 15 If respondents represent a random sample of the population and they report their own bequest share (as well as that of other heirs) correctly, we would expect the mean to be equal to the statutory share. A possible explanation that this is not the case is as follows. In the survey, respondents report the number of children (including themselves) their parents had. However, if some of those children had died by the time the survey was conducted, this would explain why respondents' bequest shares deviate upward from their statutory shares. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the total bequest shares of other siblings are smaller than their total statutory shares.
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between primary and the secondary inheritances. We use Tobit regression as our primary choice to estimate the model, since is bounded below by −1. While the Tobit estimator handle the bounded nature of the dependent variable well, it may not be consistent if the error term is heteroskedastic or non-normal. Therefore, we also report OLS regression results to confirm the robustness of our results across estimation methods.
Our covariates in the regression can be classified into the following categories corresponding to the types of bequest motives listed above. First, to proxy the dynastic motive, we include the following three variables: (1) a quasi-dummy variable that takes one (minus one) if the respondent is male (female), (2) a dummy variable that takes one if the respondent is the eldest son, and (3) the share of real assets in the total assets that the respondent inherited. The coefficient on the gender quasi-dummy is expected to be positive if males (females) are treated favorably (unfavorably). To gauge the gender effect relative to siblings of the same sex only, we also include a separate dummy (referred to as "siblings dummy" below) that takes one if the respondent has one or more siblings, and intersect our gender quasi-dummy with the siblings dummy 16 as well as with a dummy that takes one if the respondent has a sibling/siblings of the other sex. The coefficient on the eldest son dummy (intersected with the siblings dummy) is also expected to be positive if bequests are distributed disproportionately to the eldest son who takes over as patriarch of the family. Finally, the reason why we include the share of real assets is that an heir who inherited residential assets from a decedent is most likely to be an heir who plays a key role in maintaining the family line. Therefore, if the dynastic motive plays a role in the division of bequests in Japanese households, the coefficient on this real-asset-share variable should also to be positive.
Second, to control for the parental desire to treat children impartially, we include the following two variables: (1) a dummy variable that takes one if the respondent has a higher educational attainment than other siblings, and (2) a dummy variable that takes one if the respondent regularly received financial assistance from his/her parent(s). Some parents may feel happier if they treat all children equally in the sense that all children receive the same amount of intergenerational transfers as a whole (not only through inheritances). With regard to the dummy for those who are better educated than other siblings (intersected with the siblings dummy), we expect the marginal effect of this dummy to be negative if parents consider investment in their children's human capital (as a form of intergenerational asset transfer) and bequests to be substitute. Similarly, we expect the effect of the dummy for those who received parental financial assistance in the past also to be negative.
Third, we examine altruism toward family members by considering the following three 16 Our use of a quasi-dummy implies that we impose the constraint that the gender effect is symmetric (relative to persons that only have siblings of the same sex as themselves).
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factors in primary inheritances: (1) a dummy variable that takes one if the respondent reports that he/she is economically better-off than other siblings, (2) the past occupational status of the surviving parent (for the longest job held), and (3) the age of the surviving parent at the time of the primary inheritance. If heirs are altruistic toward other family members, the marginal effect of the first dummy variable (the better-off dummy intersected with the siblings dummy) should be negative. Regarding the past occupational status, we include two separate dummy variables:
one that takes one for surviving parents who were self-employed or small business owners, and another one that takes one for surviving parents who worked as an employee. If a surviving parent was self-employed/a small business owner or had a long work history as an employee, he/she was likely to have earned more throughout his/her working life than those in the other categories (e.g., full-time homemakers), and therefore had the opportunity to adequately prepare for retirement through pensions and savings. Consequently, we expect that the past occupational status of the surviving parent will have a positive effect on the deviation of respondents' actual share from the statutory share, since surviving parents with a long work history are more likely to be able to afford handing part of their share to their children. Regarding the age of the surviving parent, we construct the following two dummies: (1) a dummy variable for surviving parents who were between 60 and 74 years of age (at the time of their spouse's death) and (2) a dummy for surviving parents who were 75 years of age or older (at the time of their spouse's death). If one parent died when the other parent was still (relatively) young, the surviving spouse would likely have more years to live and thus probably need more financial resources. Therefore, we expect the dummies for older surviving parents (i.e., those between 60 and 74 as well as those over 74) to be positive, based on the assumption that children take the needs of the surviving parent into account when negotiating the division of the bequest.
Fourth, to investigate parental strategic behavior, we include the following three dummy variables: (1) a dummy for respondents who lived with the decedent, (2) a dummy for respondents who lived with the surviving parent, and (3) a dummy for respondents who regularly provided financial assistance to their parents. We expect that those who live(d) with their parents and/or who provide(d) financial support to their parents are likely to receive more in a primary inheritance if parents behave strategically to encourage children to provide assistance and attention in exchange for a bequest. 17 While we include the same cohabitation and financial assistance dummies also in the secondary inheritance regressions, the coefficients on these 17 The coefficients probably reflect not only the causal effect of co-residence and/or financial assistance on bequests, but also causal effects running in the opposite direction. Such reverse causality arises when children expect to receive bequests from their parents by living with their parents and/or providing assistance (see, e.g., Brown [2006] and Horioka, Gahramanov, Hayat, and Tang [2016] ). Therefore, while the regression results in this study do not identify the causal effect, they do provide evidence that the patterns of bequest division in Japan are consistent with the presence of parental strategic motives.
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 16 dummies no longer represent the effect of parental strategic behavior, since parents do not play a role in bequest division negotiations in secondary inheritances unless decedents die testate. Since in practice dying testate is rare in Japan, we do not regard these two variables in the secondary inheritance regressions as testing whether parents behave strategically, but as variables regarding family values shared by the heirs (children). Therefore, when examining secondary inheritances, we classify the cohabitation and financial assistance dummies into the "other motives" category.
Finally, we add the following three variables to consider other possible factors: (1) a dummy for respondents who had a better relationship with their parents than other siblings (intersected with the siblings dummy), (2) a dummy for those who paid taxes when they received inherited assets, and (3) a dummy for affluent parents. The first variable takes one if respondents report that they had a better relationship with their parents than their sibling(s). If the division of bequests is influenced by heirs' relationship with their parents (compared to their siblings), we expect the marginal effect of this dummy to be positive. The latter two variables are included to investigate whether heirs had an incentive to reduce inheritance tax payments by adjusting the bequest allocation in the primary inheritance. The dummy for the tax payment takes one if the inherited assets were subject to inheritance tax. Meanwhile, the dummy to capture the affluence of respondents' parents is constructed based on respondents' subjective answer to a question about their parents' living standard when the respondents were children. The dummy variable takes one for respondents that chose the highest category ("Very wealthy") regarding their parents' living standard during their (respondents') childhood (compared to that of the average family) among seven categories (from "Very poor" to "Very wealthy"). If the bequest amount is large enough to be subject to inheritance tax, we expect that respondents' share deviates upward from the statutory share (and surviving spouses' share deviates downward), since this should allow such heirs to reduce their tax liabilities. Therefore, the effects of those two dummies are expected to be positive.
As mentioned previously, we run regression (1) separately for primary inheritance observations and secondary inheritance observations. In the secondary inheritance regression, we exclude some of the altruism-related dummies, the dummy for living with the surviving parent, and the tax incentive-related dummies from our specification, because in secondary inheritances there is no room for parental altruism to play a role, no surviving parent to live with, and no room to reduce tax liabilities. Moreover, in the secondary inheritance regressions we do not use observations for only children, since in secondary inheritances the division of bequests in onlychild families is unlikely to deviate from the statutory share (100 percent). 18
Empirical results
18 Previous studies, e.g., Wilhelm (1996) , Norton and Taylor (2005) , and Norton and Van Houtven (2006), also exclude the only child observations in analyzing bequest division among children.
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Determinants of bequest division in primary inheritances
We start by examining the determinants of the deviation of respondents' (or their spouse's) actual share in primary inheritances from their statutory share. 19 As a surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her views in the division of the bequests, it is likely that the patterns of bequest division in primary inheritances provide a clearer reflection of parental bequest motives than secondary inheritances.
The estimated marginal effects (coefficients) based on the Tobit as well as OLS regressions are reported in Table 4 . We employ two different specifications, one with and one without age dummies for the surviving parent (columns A to D). Since the information necessary for constructing the surviving parent age dummies is often missing, the sample size is substantially reduced when we run the regressions with these dummies. Therefore, to ensure that the calculated effects do not result from the small number of observations, we report the results with specifications with and without the surviving parent age dummies.
The estimated marginal effects indicate that a variety of bequest motives, such as dynastic and strategic motives, have a significant impact on the division of bequests among heirs.
Moreover, results appear to hardly change regardless of the estimation method employed (Tobit or OLS) or choice of specification (with or without the surviving parent age dummies). In addition, to further confirm the robustness of our findings, we ran regressions using observations for which the sum of bequest shares of individual heirs (i.e., the respondent, the surviving parent, other siblings, and other heirs) equaled 100 percent (see the right half of Table 4 ). Our findings remain unchanged even when we focus on these "cleaner" observations. Looking at the dynastic motive, the estimated effects of the gender quasi-dummy indicate that, in Japan, males receive larger bequests from their parents than females. This suggests that the traditional family system with an emphasis on the male line still appears to have an influence on the division of bequests. While the coefficient on the first son dummy is insignificant, the positive and significant coefficient on the real assets share implies that the heir of the family line tends to inherit a larger share than other siblings, indicating again that dynastic motives appear to play a role.
Next, turning to the variables examining whether parents treat their children equally, the estimated coefficients clearly indicate that respondents who are better educated and/or who received financial support from their parents tend to receive smaller bequests in primary inheritances. This is probably because parents consider investment in their children's human capital and inter vivos financial support as substitutes for bequests and try to equalize the total ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 18 amount of these intergenerational transfers across siblings. 20 Looking at the variables examining altruism toward family members, we find that (parental) altruism in the form of assisting relatively worse-off children (represented by a negative coefficient on the dummy for economically advantaged children) does not seem to play a significant role. On the other hand, we find that respondents' share is larger when the surviving parent was self-employed or an employee (relative to the case where the surviving parent was a full-time homemaker). A possible interpretation is that surviving parents who were self-employed or an employee are likely to be better off than surviving parents who were a full-time homemaker, and that, in the negotiations surrounding a primary inheritance, better-off surviving parents handed a larger share of a bequest to their children or that, conversely, in the case of less well-off parent, children handed a larger share to their parent. When we include dummies for the age group of the surviving parent, as shown in columns B, D, F, and H of Table 4 , we find that the coefficients are positive and significant, implying that respondents with a younger surviving parent tend to receive less, presumably because the surviving parent is expected to have longer to live and therefore have greater financial needs than an older surviving parent. These findings are consistent with the altruism motive, indicating that children consider the economic needs of their surviving parent when dividing bequests among heirs.
Turning to strategic motives, we expect the coefficients both on the decedent coresidence dummy and on the surviving spouse co-residence dummy to be positive if parental strategic motives play a role in dividing bequests in primary inheritances. We find that although respondents that had lived with a decedent did not receive a significantly larger bequest share, those that lived with a surviving parent did, probably reflecting the guiding influence of surviving parents in primary inheritances. Meanwhile, whether respondents had provided financial assistance to their parents did not have a significant effect on the bequest share they received, regardless of which specification are employed. 21 Finally, looking at the coefficients on the other miscellaneous dummies -i.e., the dummy representing how good respondents' relationship with their parents was and the dummy representing whether respondents had an incentive to avoid inheritance tax payments -are positive as expected but statistically insignificant. The fact that the result for the inheritance tax dummy is insignificant is not surprising, given that only around 4 percent of inheritance events 20 Although we regard the dummy for heirs' educational attainment as representing the amount of parental investment in their children's education, the education variable also allows another interpretation. That is, if we regard it as a proxy for permanent income, the negative effect of greater educational attainment may be a sign of compensatory bequests in the sense that siblings with a higher permanent income receive less from their parents. 21 One possible explanation why this dummy is insignificant is that it may reflect respondents' financial strength. If parents tend to bequeath less to well-off children, such altruistically-motivated behavior may offset parental strategic behavior. 
Determinants of bequest division in secondary inheritances
Having found that the patterns of bequest division in primary inheritances are consistent with a variety of bequest motives suggested in the literature, we now turn to the analysis of secondary inheritances. Since negotiations in secondary inheritances do not include a surviving spouse, the only way that parents can ensure that their wishes are heeded is to prepare a will. However, since in Japan less than 10 percent of decedents leave a will, patterns of bequest division in secondary inheritances largely reflect traditional family values in Japan shaping negotiations among heirs (children). Based on this reasoning, we expect the comparison of primary and secondary inheritances to provide useful insights into parental bequest motives. Table 5 reports the estimation results of the Tobit and OLS models for secondary inheritances. As explained in Section 4.2, we exclude terms that are irrelevant for secondary inheritances. Broadly speaking, the estimated coefficients in Table 5 follow a similar pattern to that observed in the regressions for primary inheritances reported in Table 4 . Specifically, starting with the variables intended to capture the dynastic motive, we obtain positive and significant marginal effects both for the gender quasi-dummy and for the ratio of real assets. This finding implies that in secondary inheritances, in which parental motives may be reflected less clearly, bequests still appear to be divided in line with the dynastic (family-line) motive. That being said, the magnitude of the estimated marginal effects is smaller in the regressions for secondary inheritances. This implies that decedents (parents) are more concerned about the continuation of the family line than their heirs (children), but heirs (to some extent) also allow the unequal division of bequests in order to compensate those responsible for maintaining the family line for the associated costs (such as holding memorial services, maintaining the family grave, etc).
Turning to the variables examining the equal treatment of children, we find that the negative coefficient on the dummy for better educated respondents (or their spouses) becomes smaller and statistically insignificant, while that on the dummy for those who received financial assistance from their parents becomes close to zero. This result suggests that while parents in primary inheritances try to balance out total transfers across their children to show that they treat their children equally, in the negotiations regarding secondary inheritances children do not dare to seek redress for special benefits (such as inter vivos gifts and educational costs). This finding may be understood as evidence that children respect parents' decision to treat children differently during their lifetime in terms of gifts and education expenses.
The marginal effect on the dummy for economically advantaged respondents (or their spouses) is insignificant, suggesting that altruism toward economically disadvantaged family members does not play a role in the allocation of secondary inheritances. The coefficient on the ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 20 dummy for the relationship with parents is again insignificant. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient on the dummy for respondents (or their spouses) who lived with a decedent is positive and significant, meaning that those who took care of their parent(s) tend to receive more in secondary inheritances than their siblings. Since in secondary inheritances both parents have died and hence are not involved in any negotiations, the variable cannot be considered to be a proxy for the strategic motive. Instead, the positive coefficient therefore rather shows that heirs, based on traditional family values, may agree on the uneven allocation in order to offset the costs disproportionately borne by the sibling who took care of their parent(s). Finally, we find that the coefficient on the dummy for children that provided financial assistance to their parent(s) is insignificant. This result, which seems slightly inconsistent with the previous finding, probably reflects the fact that (contrary to the case of co-residence) the provision of financial assistance to parents is not necessarily observable to other siblings.
To sum up, while both in primary and secondary inheritances bequests appear to be divided in accordance with a variety of parental bequest motives proposed in the literature, the estimated coefficients on the variables proxying motives, especially those for dynastic motives as well as the desire to treat children equally, are larger and statistically more significant in primary inheritance. However, it is not surprising that parental motives are reflected more clearly in the division of bequests when the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her intentions.
Further evidence
While we found that parental bequest motives, such as dynastic and strategic motives, can be more clearly identified in primary than in secondary inheritances, an unequal division could nevertheless also be observed in secondary inheritances. We inferred that the unequal division in secondary inheritances primarily reflected heirs' traditional family values rather than parental motives, based on the assumption that the only way parents could directly influence the division of secondary inheritances was by preparing a will and based on the fact that the share of decedents that had prepared a will was negligibly small. Although ignoring the role played by wills seems like a reasonable first approximation, there is a risk that our findings so far may be contaminated by the role played by wills. Therefore, to address such concern, in this subsection we examine the effects of the presence of a will. Table 6 reports the share of inheritances in which a will by the decedent was present.
Column A shows that a will was left only in 7 percent of total inheritance events in our sample.
Comparing columns B and C, the share is smaller in primary inheritances than in secondary inheritances. Further, Table 7 shows that even after controlling for decedents' characteristics (i.e., age of the decedent, his/her educational attainment, and total value of assets bequeathed (in log)), the difference between primary and secondary inheritances in the share of cases in which a will
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is present is statistically significant. 22 The smaller share of wills in primary inheritances likely results from the fact that in primary inheritances wills are not necessary to make heirs comply with parents' intentions, since the surviving spouse will be present during the family negotiations to ensure the wishes of the deceased are taken into account.
Next, to examine how the presence of a will affects the division of bequests, Table 8 compares the percentage of heirs who report that their share was different from the statutory share in cases where a will was present and in cases where no will was present. We expect that if the purpose of leaving a will is to divide bequests unequally to achieve a particular outcome based on the parental motives discussed above, the percentage of respondents reporting a deviation should be higher when a will was left than when no will was left. While the percentages reported are higher in cases where a will was left, the difference between cases with and without a will as expected does not appear to be very large. Therefore, the results suggest that wills are used only marginally to deviate from the statutory shares. 23 The findings above indicate that, in Japan, bequests are often divided unequally among children even without the presence of a will or a parent. The unequal division of bequests in Japan therefore appears to reflect certain values shared by families and their members -which, in turn, are shaped by traditional family values -that make such unequal treatment acceptable or even desirable. This interpretation is further supported by responses to our "Family and Lifestyle Survey" questionnaire. The survey first asked respondents whether they thought bequests should be divided in accordance with the statutory division. The results show that 77 percent (=1,427/2,297) of respondents thought that it was not necessary to adhere to the statutory share. 24 Respondents who replied that it was not necessary to adhere to the statutory division were further asked to answer another question about the merits of a non-statutory unequal division.
The distribution of answers is shown in Table 9 . Almost half of the respondents indicated that they thought this allowed giving due consideration to children that had lived with and/or taken care of their parent(s). The second most common response was that it allowed them to distribute the bequest so that the surviving parent was well taken care of. These responses indicate that children (heirs) in Japan first consider the life of their parent before demanding their own share 22 Although not reported here to conserve space, we also controlled further for heirs' (children's) characteristics, such as the number of siblings, siblings' educational attainment, etc. However we found that doing so does not significantly affect the estimated marginal effect of the primary inheritance dummy. 23 To examine whether our regression results for secondary inheritances reported in Table 5 , which we assume to reflect traditional family values in Japan shaping negotiations among heirs, are contaminated by the presence of wills, we ran the same regression using only observations without a will. The results are reported in Appendix Table 2 and are essentially unchanged from those in Table 5 . 24 Reasons given why it was not necessary to adhere to the statutory division are as follows: (i) the wishes of the deceased should be reflected in the bequest division (17.2 percent), (ii) the bequests should be divided based on an agreement among heirs (8.2 percent), (iii) the division should be allowed to differ across families depending on their situation (36.7 percent) and (iv) don't know (14.9 percent).
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of an inheritance. A little less than a quarter of respondents answered that it would allow them to distribute the bequest to maintain the family line (and/or family businesses). This means that children (heirs) in contemporary Japan are still often concerned about the family line even without the presence of a parent. In addition, Japanese heirs appear to be concerned about the well-being of economically disadvantaged siblings as well as dividing bequest to minimize the tax burden, and they often choose non-statutory (unequal) shares even in secondary inheritances where no parent or will are present.
Conclusion
Using a unique survey-based micro dataset, we investigated the intra-family division of bequests in Japan to examine the importance of institutional and cultural differences in understanding patterns of bequest division and to understand parental motivations behind intergenerational asset transfers.
We first argue that certain circumstances making (observable) bequests equal (among children) in the United States are not present in Japan. As a result, in contrast with the United States, where most bequests are divided equally, a substantial share of bequests in Japan are divided unequally. We then utilize the observed patterns of unequal bequest division in Japan to identify parental bequest motives. Among other things, comparing primary and secondary inheritances allowed us to examine the role of parental motives and traditional family values in Japan.
We found that parental motives show up more clearly in primary inheritances, where the surviving spouse is likely to be involved in the negotiations regarding how the bequest should be divided among family members. The analysis suggests that the division of bequests in Japan reflects parents' desire to maintain the family line and to treat children equally in terms of the total lifetime transfers they receive. Parents also appear to bequeath more to children living with the surviving parent, which is in line with models of parental strategic behavior. However, contrary to the prediction of standard altruism models, parents do not bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children, although children appear to altruistically allocate bequests to a (disadvantaged) surviving parent.
We further find that even in secondary inheritances, where no parent is present, it is not uncommon to observe unequal bequests in Japan. Our analysis indicates that wills do not play an important role in explaining such unequal bequests. Instead, unequal division reflects heirs' own preference to give a larger share to the heir to the family line and/or those who took care of their parents in old age. This suggests that we cannot ignore the role of cultural differences when comparing patterns of bequest division among countries with different social and cultural norms.
Finally, turning to the implications of our findings, it is well known that parental altruism ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.333 "The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households" 23 plays a key role in the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Our finding that parental motives other than the altruistic motive play a role therefore probably implies that Ricardian equivalence does not hold in Japan and that tax cuts financed by the issuance of government bonds are likely to have some effect. Regarding the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities, our finding that altruism does not seem to play a large role potentially implies that, as suggested by Horioka (2014) , in Japan wealth inequalities are less likely to be passed on from generation to generation.
On the other hand, dynastic (family line) motive-based inheritances potentially intensify the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. 
Primary inheritances Secondary inheritances
Appendix I
To provide further support for our interpretation of the results reported in Table 4 , in this Appendix we examine the determinants of the deviation of the surviving spouse's actual share from his/her statutory share. For Appendix Table 1 , we run regression (1) for the surviving spouse, since in the case of primary inheritances our survey asks not only about the bequest share of the respondent (and/or his/her spouse) but also that of the surviving spouse.
If the surviving spouse for some reason receives a smaller share than the statutory share, his/her children are likely to receive a larger share than their statutory share, and vice versa. We expect that variables that explain respondents' (or their spouse's) share also explain the share of the surviving spouse.
When estimating equation (1) using the information on surviving parents, we exclude from the explanatory variables in variables regarding respondents' characteristics. For example, the variables used to examine the dynastic motive, such as the gender quasi-dummy, the eldest son dummy, and the real assets ratio, are not expected to affect the bequest share of surviving parents.
The results are presented in Appendix Table 1 and are essentially the same regardless of whether all observations (columns A and B) or only those for whom the sum of reported shares (among heirs) equals 100 percent (columns C and D) are used. The negative coefficients on the past occupational status and the age of the surviving parent indicate that surviving spouses who are economically disadvantaged and/or with a longer expected remaining life span tend to receive a larger share, which is the reverse side of the positive effects observed for respondents (and their spouses) in Table 4 . The significantly negative coefficient on the co-residence dummy suggests that surviving parents tend to take a smaller share and give part of their share to their children if they live with their children. This is consistent with the fact that the effect of the dummy for living with a surviving parent is significantly positive in Table 4 . Finally, the coefficients on the tax dummies are again not statistically significant, although their signs are negative, which is consistent with our findings in Table 4 .
Appendix II.
Appendix Table 2 reports the result of the secondary inheritance share regressions using only observations in which no will was present. Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Marginal effects are calculated as β l ×Φ(X β/σ) at the mean of covariates. 
All observations excluding those with a will
